In this paper, we present the results of an empirical study that attempts to analyse the risk of bank run in Geneva, Switzerland. Two similar surveys have been conducted upon two independent samples of Geneva population (June 2008 and February 2009) 
INTRODUCTION
Switzerland is a European country with a renowned banking tradition. The industry employs 3% of the national active population and represents 10% of the country's GDP. It hosts two main international financial hubs, Zurich and Geneva, as well as other cities active in the industry (Schriber, 2007) .
The Swiss banking system is characterised by two major international private banks, Credit Suisse and UBS as well as several publicly owned financial institutions, i.e. Cantonal Banks and The Swiss Post. Also, there are private retail banks spread at the national level such as Raiffeisen, Migros and Coop banks, private bankers and foreign banks settled in the main Swiss cities, for a total of 388 institutions 1 .
During the first quarter of 2009, the Swiss banking system showed positive signals, with both main private banks deposits increasing. Credit Suisse counted CHF +8.8 billion while UBS CHF -14.9 billion new deposits instead of CHF -85.6 billion the quarter before (source: UBS 1 st quarter 2009 results).
In this difficult context, individuals' perception and trust in the banking system should be constantly monitored to prevent and detect the spread of panic that could lead to a bank run (Catenazzo & Fragnière, 2009) The risk of bank run hits banks episodically (or seasonally) but with huge consequences (Dwyer & Gilbert, 1989) . We learn from the Risk Management Theory that, when dealing with the service industry, we can manage risks through ex-ante (to anticipate) or ex-post (to reduce damages) actions and controls (Fragnière & Sullivan, 2006) . Anticipated controls are considered as more successful as they allow to avoid the risk occurrence and to keep a high reputation level, a condition sine qua non when dealing with intangibles (Dubosson et al., 2008) .
To constantly monitor the banks customers' moods can be considered as a preventive (anticipated) measure to identify predictive signals to better manage the risk (Catenazzo & Fragnière, 2009 ). Thus, we wish to underlie key elements of perception dealing with the bank run risk with the purpose to design and apply efficient risk management measures.
Therefore, this empirical research evidences sociological factors connected with the risk of bank run.
Through a sociological approach, we wish to identify whether the risk of run on banks exists in Geneva, the second Swiss financial hub. Also, we would like to draw useful recommendations for policy makers and the industry to design effective risk prevention measures.
Our research is based upon the analysis and the comparison of two surveys addressed to Geneva population.
We interviewed two independent samples; the first one (June 2008) 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The bank run experienced by Great Britain with the Northern Rock Bank case has been studied in depth by several authors (see for example Hall, 2008; Keasey & Veronesi, 2008; Llewellyn, 2008; . In particular, Hall (Hall, 2008) and Yorulmazer present the story of the default of Northern Rock Bank, United Kingdom's No. 5 mortgage bank.
Among others, the bank's business model weaknesses have been evidenced among the main default causes (Keasy & Veronesi, 2008; Llewellyn, 2008) . Failures in the public regulator control activity (Hall, 2008; Keasy & Veronesi, 2008) , as well as the breaches within the United Kingdom banking system have also been highlighted (Hall, 2008) . Despite of being heavily analyzed, this case had limited spill over effects to the country's banking system; up to mid 2008, United Kingdom was not been heavily affected by the US sub-prime mortgage crisis .
Therefore, it seems that UK banking system and the national regulation can be listed among the main causes of the bank run (Hall, 2008) . Indeed, the bank's original business model, funding mechanisms and securitisation levels sheltered the Northern Rock bank from national authorities' controls and policies.
Generally speaking about the bank run phenomenon, the model designed by Diamond and Dybvig presents bank run as the negative consequence of series of coordination games: whether a depositor starts to withdraw early, then a panic reaction follows (Alonso, 1996) . This model and further studies also point out that changes occurring to states of the economy may lead to bank panics (Bougheas, 1999) .
The relationship between bank run and the banking sector size has been explored by Miller (Miller, 2008) who affirms that countries with middle-sized banking sectors are less likely to experience bank run episodes than the others.
Zhu (Zhu, 2001) classifies the bank run risk in two main categories: we the author talks "Type-I" bank runs in which the panic and the run to the banks is not connected to objective difficulties. By contrast, "Type-II" bank run occurs during economic crises or tough times.
During economic downturns, in an unregulated environment, bank runs are likely to be contagious (Bougheas, 1999) and even overcome the national borders (Vaugirard, 2005) . Also, the likelihood of bank runs is even higher in case of correlations between banks; transparent information is considered an efficient preventive measure to avoid this additional drawback (Chen & Hasan, 2006) .
The individuals' behaviours throughout bank run (or "bank panic") episodes have been studied and modelled by Carlson (Carlson, 2002) . The author draws two theories: the "random withdrawal theory" and the "asymmetric information theory". The former states that people run to banks thinking the bank's liquidity insufficient to satisfy all customers' needs. The latter stresses on poor information available: since people are unaware of the institutions in trouble, they withdraw from all banks of the area. These two theories have been tested in the Denver (Colorado) 1893 bank run crisis.
The relevance of the "asymmetric information theory" has been evidenced during the analysis of the 1994 bank run in Argentina. In this case, reliable information disclosure about the crisis has lowered the likelihood of a run to all local banks (Schumacher, 2000) . The 2007 Northern Rock Bank run confirms this behaviour: after a clear and official information presentation as well as the bank's bailout announcement, the other banks of country quickly regained the depositors' confidence. However, during contagious bank run phenomena, depositors do not difference between banks and rush on all financial institutions (Chen & Hasan, 2008) .
As put by Yorulmazer , people seem to have a rational behaviour when they follow the market news. Indeed, if people are up-to-date throughout the whole financial turmoil, they would be more likely to put off cash withdrawals. This is one of the main findings of an experimental study conducted by the CESS (Center for Experimental Social Science) at New York University (Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2008) . Also, the two authors (Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2008) claim the bank insiders to be beneficial in avoiding bank runs.
Among others, information disclosure about the banks' assets can be used as a successful tool to prevent bank runs (Selvaretnam, 2007) .
Oppositely, imperfect information is the cause of most of Type-I (panic-driven) bank run events (Zhu, 2001) . Contagious runs could be a further drawback due to the lack of complete and trustful information (Chen, 1999) .
Together with information disclosure, the analysis of private or governmental deposit insurances is an important direction for the bank run research. In fact, deposit insurances seem to be a successful disincentive to bank runs (Carlson, 2002; Chen and Hasan, 2005; Hall, 2008; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2008, Schumacher, 2000) . The design of deposit insurance has been investigated: partial deposit protection is useful but not sufficient to avoid the risk of a bank run. Thus full coverage on deposits should be applied. However, this policy has its drawbacks: it may distort the bank market equilibrium because of the lack of customers' control on the bank solidity (Chen and Hasan, 2005; Llewellyn, 2008 , Wheelock & Wilson, 1995 .
According to Zhu (Zhu, 2001) , deposit insurance drawbacks lead to an imperfect social optimum equilibrium. The Kansas bank crisis (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) case shows that the banks taking part to state deposit insurance system revealed themselves to be more at risk than the others. This was due by a more risk-taking attitude and, consequently, high-risk portfolios in their lockers (Wheelock & Wilson, 1995) .
Llewellyn (Llewellyn, 2008) confirms this thesis: a complete deposits' protection can result in bankers and customers taking more risks since whatever happens, clients will be entirely refunded. On the other hand, if the deposit protection does not cover the entire amount, depositors tend to withdraw their savings if they have doubts about the solvency of their bank. For these reasons, Niinimäki (Niinimäki, 2002) states that bank runs can be prevented without deposit insurance.
A further measure to avoid bank run and its contagious outcome has been underlined by Bougheas (Bougheas, 1999) who advocates a temporary suspension of deposits convertibility into cash to allow the solvent banks to order their liquidity. Temporary suspension could even improve depositors' welfare according to Chen and Hasan (Chen & Hasan, 2008) . Calling for a deposit contact adjustments has also been evidenced by Alonso (Alonso, 1999) . This literature review, although not exhaustive, indicates that too little sociological knowledge is available to understand individuals' behaviours and attitudes to anticipate the occurrence of the bank run risk. In this study, we intend to highlight some social patterns associated with these issues in Geneva. The Swiss city is the second largest national financial centre and is situated only a few hundred miles from other European financial hubs such as Zurich, Paris, Frankfurt, and Milan.
METHODOLOGY
To further the topic under study in this paper, i.e. the identification of significant sociological hints to predict a bank run, we have made an empirical study in Geneva, the second Swiss financial hub. To discover the main sociological patterns associated with this theme, we have designed two questionnaires that were submitted to two independent samples representative of the local population. The first survey has been administered in questions. Again, additional questions design has been through the analysis of further interviews. We also got useful comments and suggestions to our article presenting the first survey's results (Catenazzo & Fragnière, 2009 ) by many banks and international seminar participants to further our research. The new queries aim to deep understanding of possible individuals' attitudes and behaviours in a bank run context.
The identification of predictive hints concerning individuals' attitudes and behaviours within future scenarios has been conducted through the inclusion in our questionnaire of Contingent Valuation Methods (Bateman and Turner, 1992; Hoevenagel, 1994) . Thanks to this method borrowed from psychology and the environmental sciences (Debély et al., 2008; Garrods and Willis, 1999; Hansla et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2002; Imandoust & Gadam, 2007; Nomura & Akai, 2004) , we attempt to assess individuals' typical attitudes and behaviours within hypothetical settings. In the second survey, we attempted to define more precisely individuals' concern about their savings. 31.9%
of the people who are worried affirm to be little worried about their savings, 41.5% feel moderately concerned, 18.6% say to be very worried and 8% do not know.
We asked the interviewees what type of savers they are. 55.8% (50.1%) of the respondents consider themselves as "average savers", 21.8% (23.1%) said "poor savers", 9.0% (13.2%) "not saver at all", 11.4% (11.8%) "high saver" and 2.0% (1.7%) do not know. We decided to ask the same question but in a different way. So we asked the respondents to indicate approximately (in percentage) the share of their income destined to their savings. 38.2% (35.7%) of the interviewees affirmed saving approximately 5% to 20% of their income.
30.1% (33.1%) save less than 5%, 11.6% (12%) more than 20% and 7.7% (9.7%) do not save any of their income. 12.4% (9.5%) cannot answer this question.
We later asked the interviewees two questions concerning their current consumption of banking services.
First of all, we enquired whether individuals' money is deposited into one or more banks. 47.1% (50.4%) affirmed their money is split into several banks, while 46.1% (46.5%) have all their money in one bank. 5.3%
(1.7%) provide alternative possibilities, and 1.5% (1.4%) do not know.
Then, we asked the respondents the bank or financial institutions they deposited their money. To explore more in depth individuals' attitudes towards their banks, we asked the respondents to assess their confidence in Swiss banks by assigning them a mark. The average mark given is 6.21 (6.88) on a scale spanning from 1 to 10 (10 being the highest mark). The mode of the answers provided is 8 (8), and the median is 6 (7). It seems that Geneva population trust in Swiss banks is generally high but slightly deteriorating. moderately agree with this affirmation, while 13.2% do not agree at all and 11.6% do not know.
As presented in the literature review section, the banks' deposit insurance is key research direction in the bank run risk analysis. In February 2009, we asked the interviewees if they were reassured by the fact that the guaranteed savings passed from CHF 30'000 to CHF 100'000 8 . 41.6% of the sample is moderately reassured by this increase, while 25.7% feel totally reassured, 12.5% are not reassured at all and 20.2% do not know.
At the end of both questionnaires, we presented five hypothetical scenarios to understand behaviours individuals are likely to show within a bank run scenarios as well as to identify useful sociological hints to predict and prevent the occurrence of a bank run.
First, in case of a panic movement (i.e. bank run), 41.1% (40.0%) affirm they would not follow the rush on bank for cash withdrawals, while 28.2% (26.5%) would. About a third of the samples cannot answer.
Then we enquired about the source of information that would push the interviewees to withdraw their savings in the case of a failure of their bank. The role of information is crucial when dealing with bank run:
clear and faithful corporate communication is an important driver to avoid the bank panic spreads (Catenazzo & Fragnière, 2009 ). "Media" take the first place with 50.1% of calls, followed by "the bank" with 45.0%, "The Swiss Confederation" 39.9%, "a relative" 26.3% and 9.1% do not know. do not know.
We finally asked how the interviewees would react if the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (the Swiss
Federal Authority in charge of providing the national banking licence and to control the industry) announced the imminent failure of a bank, without specifying which one. In this case, less than one of four of the respondents, 23.7% would withdraw immediately their money, while 59.6% would wait for more information, 7.2% would do nothing, 2.6% would wait to see how the population reacts and 7.0% do not know.
HYPOTHESES TESTING
Descriptive statistics have shown that Geneva population is generally confident in their banks. thus, we employ non-parametrical tests to validate our hypotheses (Bryman & Cramer, 2006) .
The first hypothesis we have tested deals with people fear of losing their savings. This is a relevant issue since banks loss of credibility to ensure the savers' refunded can be counted among the possible reasons of a bank run (Diamond & Dybvig, 1986) . Also, if people perceive their savings being at risk, they will be more likely to run on banks (Catenazzo & Fragnière, 2009 worried to lose your savings?" Respondents could answer either "yes", "no" or "I don't know".
The first test we have made is called "Kolmogorov-Smirnov" for two independent samples commonly used to verify whether the distribution of values within two samples differs (Bryman & Cramer 2006) . We have retained a significance level of 5% in which we would fall in the first-type error which is the risk to reject the null hypothesis when it is actually correct. We further our analysis by verifying whether individuals have changed their behaviour on keeping up-todate of the current financial turmoil through media communication means. Our literature review has underlined the strategic role of information to prevent the occurrence of a bank run or to limit its damages (Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2008) . Moreover, poorly informed individuals are more likely to follow a bank run stream: the more informed the people the more rationally they behave, then avoiding runs to all banks, notoriously panicdriven ("Type-I") runs (Chen, 1999 and Zhu, 2001 ). Therefore, a high rate of people keeping informed all along the crisis is a positive signal. We have made a statistical test called "Kolmogorov-Smirnov" for two independent samples which is used to verify whether the distribution of values within two samples differs (Bryman & Cramer 2006) . We have retained a significance level of 5% in which we would fall in the first-type error which is the risk to reject the null hypothesis when it is actually correct.
Here follows our hypothesis scheme: samples. We asked both samples whether they keep up-to-date of the current financial crisis through media communication means. Possible answers individuals could choose among were: "yes", "no", "I don't know". (Bryman & Cramer 2006) .
Here are the results of the test: Both signals could reveal an increase of the likelihood of a bank run in Geneva. Indeed, the supposed default possibility of one of the main Swiss banks is a possible bank run driver (Catenazzo & Fragnière, 2009) . Also, the loss of confidence in financial institutions is a further predictive signal that might lead to a bank run (Carlson, 2001) . Therefore, we have made further tests to verify whether these changes are statistically significant and, we then validate our hypotheses.
The first hypothesis scheme is the following: To test this hypothesis, we have used again the "Kolmogorov-Smirnov" test with a significance level of 5%.
The variable analysed in this case refers to an identical question asked to both samples interviewees': "Do you think possible that one of the main Swiss banks defaults?" People could select between "Yes", "No" and "I don't know". The p-value of 0.000 let us reject the null hypothesis and state that there is a significant difference between To test this hypothesis, we have used the "Kolmogorov-Smirnov" test with a significance level of 5%. 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Risk inventory is the first of four steps to design measures effective corporate risk management to both financial and non-financial institutions (Fragnière & Sullivan, 2006; Tchankova, 2001) . Within the banking environment, customers' overall cash withdrawals, i.e. a "bank run" is a strategic risk that has low occurrence (it hits only episodically) but leads to high damages to the concerned institution(s).
So far, several studies have been conducted to attempt to understand the main causes of bank runs in different years and contexts. Game theory applications, informational theories and contagious effects have been studied in depth to better understand this phenomenon. Also, researchers have been investigating about the more efficient tools to prevent and to limit the bank runs effects. Let's quote, among others, the importance of clear and transparent communication whenever one or more banks are through hard times. Also, the design of deposit insurances and the cash convertibility of banks deposits are some of the tools whose advantages and drawbacks have been deeply examined and put in practise in different contexts. Descriptive statistics show that people are generally confident in banks. We also discovered that about half of the respondents' savings are split between more than one bank, the major Swiss banks gather the majority of people deposits. Moreover, the increase of the national insurance on deposits is considered as reassuring and, according to our sample, it is not a task of the Swiss Confederation to help private banks. who fear to lose their savings. This is a signal that, under certain specific circumstances, might lead to a bank run. As advocated in previous researches, information improvements, notoriously about the banks solidity' and the new national insurance on deposits of CHF 100'000, might help savers to reduce their apprehension towards the loss of their money.
Then, we have discovered a significant increase of people who keep up-to-date of the current financial crisis through media communication means. This is a positive signal since it seems that individuals behave rationally to market news.
We also evidenced a degradation of the Swiss confidence in their banks. We verified a significant rise of people believing possible that one of the major banks could default. Furthermore, people evaluation of their trust in Swiss banks has lowered, -9.73% on average in seven months only. Both indicators are representative of a decrease of the Geneva inhabitants' reliance in their banks. If this trend continues, policy makers and the industry should apply preventive measures to avoid a worsening trust level turning into panic.
In fine, this research encounters some limitations and possible directions for further studies. First of all, sampling bias is a weakness: although we have been interviewing people in different places, times and days of the week, the sample may not be fully representative of Geneva population. Also, as in most surveys, the questionnaire design may lead to further bias (OECD, 1999) .
The use of hypothetical scenarios in our questionnaires, despite of being a useful tool, suffers of a further weakness: it not sure that in real situations people behave in the same way they state they would (Garrods & Willis, 1999; OECD, 2006) . Further bias and risks are commonly associated to this type of empirical study (Equey & Fragnière, 2008) .
Future research should continue to assess the bank run risk in Geneva through sociological factors. This would be even more necessary whether the international banking system did not significantly improve in the upcoming months. Similar studies should be made in other cities in Switzerland and abroad to better monitor the situation to avoid the occurrence of a bank run and the likelihood of contagious effects.
